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UPWARD CLOSURE AND AMALGAMATION IN THE
GENERIC MULTIVERSE OF A COUNTABLE MODEL
OF SET THEORY
JOEL DAVID HAMKINS
Abstract. I prove several theorems concerning upward closure
and amalgamation in the generic multiverse of a countable tran-
sitive model of set theory. Every such model W has forcing ex-
tensions W [c] and W [d] by adding a Cohen real, which cannot be
amalgamated in any further extension, but some nontrivial forc-
ing notions have all their extensions amalgamable. An increasing
chain W [G0] ⊆ W [G1] ⊆ · · · has an upper bound W [H ] if and only
if the forcing had uniformly bounded essential size in W . Every
chain W ⊆ W [c0] ⊆ W [c1] ⊆ · · · of extensions adding Cohen reals
is bounded above by W [d] for some W -generic Cohen real d.
Consider a countable transitive model of set theory W |= ZFC in the
context of all its forcing extensions. Several natural questions im-
mediately suggest themselves concerning issues of amalgamation and
upward-closure. For example, can any two such models be amalga-
mated into a common larger model? In other words, is this collection of
models upward directed? When can we expect to find upper bounds for
increasing chains? In this article, I shall resolve these and other similar
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questions. In particular, theorem 4 shows that there are forcing exten-
sionsW [c] andW [d], each adding a Cohen real, which have no common
further extension; theorem 8 generalizes this non-amalgamation phe-
nomenon to a wide class of other forcing notions, but theorem 9 shows
that some forcing notions do always admit amalgamation. For upward
closure, theorem 13 shows that every chain
W [c0] ⊆ W [c1] ⊆ W [c2] ⊆ · · ·
of Cohen-real extensions of W has an upper bound W [d] in another
Cohen-real extension, and theorem 12 shows generally that any chain
of forcing extensions has an upper bound if and only if the forcing was
uniformly bounded in essential size.
In order to make a self-contained presentation, this article includes
several results adapted from my previous joint work with Gunter Fuchs
and Jonas Reitz [FHR15, §2], as well as some joint work with Giorgio
Venturi.
1. The generic multiverse
Before presenting the results, let me briefly place the work into a
somewhat broader context, which furthermore has connections with is-
sues in the philosophy of set theory. Namely, the forcing extensions of
a fixed model of set theory W form an upward oriented cone in what is
called the generic multiverse ofW , which is the collection of all models
that one can reach from W by iteratively moving either to a forcing
extension or a ground model, in each case by set forcing in the relevant
model. Thus, every model M in the generic multiverse of W is reach-
able by a zig-zag path of models, where at each step we take either a
forcing extension or a ground. The generic multiverse of W itself can
be viewed as a small part, a local neighborhood, of any of the much
larger collections of models that express fuller multiverse conceptions.
For example, one could look at the class-forcing multiverse, arising by
closing W under class forcing extensions and grounds, or the pseudo-
ground multiverse, obtained by closing under pseudo-grounds, or the
multiverse arising by closing under arbitrary extensions and inner mod-
els, and so on.
These collections of models, each a toy multiverse, if you will, of-
fer various mathematically precise contexts in which one may investi-
gate multiverse issues. Questions that begin philosophically, perhaps
concerning the nature of what one might imagine as the full actual
multiverse—the multiverse in which our (current) set-theoretic uni-
verse is one amongst many other set-theoretic worlds instantiating all
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the various alternative concepts of set that we might adopt—are trans-
formed into analogous but mathematically precise questions in the toy
multiverses, and we may hope to settle them. In this way, philosoph-
ical contemplation becomes mathematical investigation, and each toy
multiverse serves as a proxy for the full actual multiverse.1 This article
is an instance of the process: by presenting the mathematical solutions
to several natural questions about closure and amalgamation in the
case of the generic multiverse of a given countable transitive model of
set theory W , we hope to gain insight about what might be true in the
multiverse of V .
One may view the generic multiverse of W as a Kripke model of
possible worlds, connected by the forcing extension and ground model
relations as a notion of accessibility, and this perspective leads one to
consider the modal logic of forcing (see [HL08, HL13, Ham03]). An
open question arising from that work is the following:
Question 1. Does the inclusion relation coincide with the ground-
model/forcing-extension relation in the generic multiverse? That is,
if M is in the generic multiverse of W and W ⊆ M , must M be a
forcing extension of W?
A related open question concerns downward directedness:
Question 2. If M and N have a common forcing extension, must they
have a common ground model?
In other words, if M [G] = N [H ] for M-generic G ⊆ P ∈ M and
N -generic H ⊆ Q ∈ N , then must there be model W such that
M = W [g] and N = W [h] both arise as forcing extensions of W ?
The downward directed grounds hypothesis (DDG) is the axiom assert-
ing that any two ground models of the universe have a common deeper
ground. Although it may appear to involve a second-order quantifier,
over grounds, in fact this axiom is first-order expressible in the lan-
guage of set theory, using the uniform definition of the ground models
(see [FHR15]). Indeed, there is an indexed parameterizaton Wr for all
sets r of all the ground models of V by set forcing, and so one may also
formulation the set-directed strengthening of the DDG, which asserts
that for any set I, there is a ground model Ws contained in every Wr
for r ∈ I.
The two questions are connected by the following fact.
1I discuss this proxy idea further in the final parts of [Ham14], but see
also [Ham12, Ham11, Ham09].
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Theorem 3. If the downward directed grounds hypothesis holds through-
out the generic multiverse of W , then inclusion coincides with the
ground-model/forcing-extension relation in that generic multiverse.
Proof. The DDG assumption implies that whenever one has a ground
model of a forcing extension, then it is also a forcing extension of a
ground model. Thus, the DDG in the generic multiverse of W implies
that the zig-zag paths need never go up and then down, that is, from a
model M up to a forcing extension M [G] and then down to a ground
model N ⊆ M [G], because since N is a ground of M [G] there is some
N -generic filter H ⊆ Q ∈ N for which N [H ] = M [G], and so by the
DDG there is a common ground U ⊆M ∩N such that M = U [g] and
N = U [h]. So one could have gotten fromM to N by going down to U ,
and then up to U [h] = N . Thus, the generic multiverse of W consists
of the forcing extensions U [g] of the grounds U of W . And if one such
model U [g] is contained in another U [h], then U ⊆ U [g] ⊆ U [h], so
that U [g] is an intermediate ZFC model between a ground model U
and a forcing extension U [h]. It now follows by the intermediate model
theorem (see [Jec03, cor. 15.43], also [FHR15, fact 11]) that U [g] is a
ground of U [h] by a quotient of the forcing giving rise to U ⊆ U [h]. 
Toshimichi Usuba has very recently announced a proof of the down-
ward directed grounds DDG hypothesis, and indeed, of the strong DDG
in ZFC, which is very welcome and exciting news, and this will settle
question 2 as well as question 1, in light of theorem 3.
2. Non-amalgamation in the generic multiverse
Let’s begin with the basic non-amalgamation result, which I first
heard from W. Hugh Woodin in the 1990s.
Theorem 4 (Woodin, [FHR15, obs. 35]). If W is any countable tran-
sitive model of set theory, then there are W -generic Cohen reals c and
d, for which the corresponding forcing extensions W [c] and W [d] have
no common extension to a model of set theory with the same ordinals.
Proof. Let us view Cohen forcing as the partial order 2<ω consisting
of finite binary sequences ordered by extension. Enumerate the dense
subsets of this forcing in W as 〈Dn | n < ω〉. Fix a real z ∈ 2
ω that
could not possibly exist in any forcing extension of W , such as a real
coding a relation on ω with order type OrdW . We shall now build the
reals c, d ∈ 2ω in stages, with
c =
⋃
n
cn d =
⋃
n
dn,
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where cn and dn are the finite binary initial segments of c and d, re-
spectively, that have been specified by stage n. We undertake the
construction in such a way that cn and dn are each in Dn, so that the
reals individually are W -generic, but from c and d together, we can
compute z. To begin, let c0 be any element of D0, and let d0 consist
of |c0| many 0s, followed by a 1 and then the 0
th bit z(0) of z, and
then extended so that d0 ∈ D0. Next, we extend c0 by padding with 0s
until it has the length of d0, and then a 1, and then the next bit z(1),
followed by an extension to c1 that is in D1. Now form d1 by padding
d0 with 0s until the length of c1, followed by a 1, followed by z(2), and
then extended to an element d1 ∈ D1. And so on in this same pattern.
Since the sequences cn and dn are in Dn, it follows that both c and
d will be W -generic Cohen reals. But notice that if we have both c
and d together, then because the padding with 0s exactly identifies the
coding points, we can therefore reconstruct the construction history cn
and dn and therefore compute the real z. So there can be no common
extensionW [c],W [d] ⊆ U to a model of ZFC with the same ordinals, as
if both c, d ∈ U , then z would also be in U , contrary to our assumption
on z. 
The same argument generalizes to construct three W -generic Cohen
reals c, d, e such that any two of them are mutually W -generic, but
the three models W [c],W [d],W [e] have no common extension with the
same ordinals. And more generally:
Theorem 5 ([FHR15, obs. 36]). If W is any countable transitive model
of set theory, then for any finite n there are distinct W -generic Cohen
reals c0, . . . , cn, any proper subset of which is mutually W -generic, but
the models W [ci] altogether have no common extension to a model of
set theory with the same ordinals as W .
Proof. Build the reals ck =
⋃
s ck,s in stages. Fix a bad real z, which
cannot exist in any extension of W with the same ordinals. Enumerate
the dense sets Ds of W for the forcing Add(ω, n) to add n many Cohen
reals. At a given stage, consider each i ≤ n in turn and extend all the
other cj,s for j 6= i in such a way so as to ensure that 〈cj〉j 6=i is in Ds,
and then pad them all with 0s to make them all have the same length;
pad cj,s with 0s also to this length, followed by a 1, followed by the
next digit of z. In this way, 〈cj〉j 6=i is W -generic for adding n many
Cohen reals, so they are mutually W -generic, but the whole collection
〈cj〉j computes the construction history and also the forbidden real
z, and therefore cannot exist in any extension of W with the same
ordinals. 
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Let us consider whether this pattern continues into the infinite.
Question 6. If W is a countable transitive model of set theory, must
there be W -generic Cohen reals 〈cn | n < ω〉, such that any finitely
many of them are mutually W -generic, but the models W [cn] for all
n < ω have no common extension to a model of set theory with the
same ordinals?
The answer, provided by theorem 12 and more forcefully by theo-
rem 13, is that no, in this infinite case we have amalgamation: every
increasing chain of Cohen-real extensions W [cn] is bounded above by
W [d] for some W -generic Cohen real d, so that W [cn] ⊆W [d] for all n.
Question 7. Does the nonamalgamation result of theorem 4 hold for
other forcing notions? Does every nontrivial forcing notion exhibit non-
amalgamation?
In other words, if W is a countable transitive model of set theory
and Q ∈ W is a nontrivial notion of forcing, are there W -generic filters
g, h ⊆ Q such that W [g] and W [h] have no common forcing extension?
The first thing to say about question 7 is that there is a large class of
forcing notions Q for which the non-amalgamation phenomenon occurs.
In particular, the reader may observe as an exercise that the proof of
theorem 4 directly generalizes to many other forcing notions, such as
adding Cohen subsets to higher cardinals, or collapsing cardinals to
ω or to another cardinal. Let us push this a bit further, however, by
defining that a notion of forcing Q is wide, if it is not |Q|-c.c. below
any condition. In other words, Q is wide, if below every condition
q ∈ Q, there is an antichain in Q ↾ q of the same size as Q. Many
commonly considered forcing notions are wide, and these all exhibit
the non-amalgamation phenomenon.
Theorem 8. If W is a countable transitive model of ZFC and Q is a
nontrivial notion of forcing that is wide in W , then:
(1) There are W -generic filters g, h ⊆ Q, such that the correspond-
ing forcing extensions W [g] and W [h] have no common exten-
sion to a model of set theory with the same ordinals as W .
(2) Indeed, for any finite number n, there are W -generic filters
g0, . . . , gn ⊆ Q, such that any proper subset of them are mu-
tually W -generic, but there is no common extension of all the
W [gk] to a model of set theory with the same ordinals as W .
(3) Furthermore, it suffices for these conclusions that Q should have
merely a nontrivial subforcing notion that is wide.
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Proof. Consider first just the first case, where we have two generic
filters. Enumerate the dense subsets of Q in W as 〈Dn | n < ω〉, and
using the wideness of Q, fix in W an assignment to each condition
q ∈ Q a maximal antichain Aq ⊆ Q ↾ q and an enumeration of it as〈
q(α) | α < |Q|
〉
. Fix also an enumeration of Q in order type |Q|, which
we may assume is an infinite cardinal in W . Outside of W , fix a bad
real z, which cannot exist in any extension of W to a model of set
theory with the same ordinals, such as a real coding the ordinals of W .
We shall construct g and h to be the respective filters generated by
the descending sequences p0 ≥ p1 ≥ · · · and q0 ≥ q1 ≥ · · · , choosing
pn, qn ∈ Dn. Begin with any p0, q0 ∈ D0. If pn and qn are defined, then
let α < |Q| be the ordinal for which qn is the α
th element of Q. We first
extend pn to the (2 · α+ z(n))
th element of Apn, thereby coding α and
the value of z(n), and then extend further to a condition pn+1 ∈ Dn+1.
Next, on the other side, we extend qn by picking the β
th element of
Aqn, where pn+1 is the β
th element of Q, and then extend further to
qn+1 ∈ Dn+1. In this way, the filters g and h generated respectively by
the pn and qn will each be W -generic, but in any extension of W that
has both g and h, we will be able to recover the map n 7→ 〈pn, qn, z(n)〉,
because if we know pn, then the way that g meets Apn determines both
qn and z(n), and the way that h meets Aqn determines pn+1. So any
extension of W with both g and h also has z, which by assumption
cannot exist in any extension of W with the same ordinals. So W [g]
and W [h] are non-amalgamable, as desired.
Just as in theorem 5, the argument generalizes to the case of adding
any finite number of W -generic filters g0, . . . , gn ⊆ Q, such that if one
omits any one of them, the result is W -generic for Q × · · · × Q, but
the full sequence cannot exist in any extension of W with the same
ordinals. One fixes a bad real z, and then enumerates the dense sets
for the n-fold product Qn, extending all but one so as to meet the
relevant dense set, extending the excluded condition into its antichain
so as to code the information that was just added by extending the
other conditions, and then also coding one more bit of z. Omitting any
one filter will result in a W -generic product of filters, but if one has all
of them, then one can reconstruct the entire construction history and
therefore also z.
Finally, let us suppose merely that Q has a subforcing notion Q0 ⊆ Q
that is wide. By what we have proved already, we may find g0, h0 ⊆ Q0
which are W -generic for Q0, but are non-amalgamable over W . Next,
we may find W [g0]-generic and W [h0]-generic filters g/g0 and h/h0,
respectively, for the quotient forcing. It follows thatW [g] andW [h] are
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non-amalgamable, since any extension of them would also amalgamate
W [g0] and W [h0]. 
The third claim of the theorem is relevant, for example, in the case
of the Le´vy collapse of an inaccessible cardinal κ. This forcing is not
wide, because it has size κ and is κ-c.c., but the Le´vy collapse does
have numerous small wide forcing factors—for example, it adds a Co-
hen real—and these are sufficient to cause the non-amalgamation phe-
nomenon.
Meanwhile, the answer to the second part of question 7 is negative,
because some forcing notions can always amalgamate their generic fil-
ters. Specifically, let us define that a forcing notion Q exhibits au-
tomatic mutual genericity over W , if whenever g, h ⊆ Q are distinct
W -generic filters, then they are mutually generic, so that g × h is W -
generic for Q×Q. In this case, bothW [g] andW [h] would be contained
in W [g × h], which would be a forcing extension of W amalgamating
them. Internalizing the concept to ZFC, let us define officially that
a forcing notion Q exhibits automatic mutual genericity, if in every
forcing extension of V , any two distinct V -generic filters G,H ⊆ Q
are mutually V -generic for Q. (This is first-order expressible in the
language of set theory.) It is easy to see that if Q has the property
that whenever p ⊥ q and p forces that D˙ is dense below qˇ, then there
is a set D in the ground model that is dense below q, and a strength-
ening p′ ≤ p such that p′ forces Dˇ ⊆ D˙, then Q exhibits automatic
mutual genericity over the ground model. This is a rigidity concept,
since if Q has nontrivial automorphisms, or even if two distinct cones
in Q are forcing equivalent, then clearly it cannot exhibit automatic
mutual genericity, since mutually generic filters are never isomorphic
by a ground-model isomorphism.
Theorem 9. If ♦ holds, then there is a notion of forcing that exhibits
automatic mutual genericity. If there is a transitive model of ZFC, then
there is one W with a notion of forcing Q, such that any two distinct
W -generic filters g, h ⊆ Q are mutually generic and hence amalgamable
by W [g × h].
Proof. By [FH09, thm. 2.6], it follows that ♦ implies that there is a
Suslin tree T on ω1 that is Suslin off the generic branch, in the sense
of [FH09, def. 2.2], which means that after forcing with T , which adds
a generic branch b ⊆ [T ], the tree remains Suslin below any node that
is not on b. (A generic Suslin tree also has this property; see [FH09,
thm. 2.3].) If a tree is Suslin off the generic branch, then it must also
have the unique branch property—forcing with it adds exactly one
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branch—since a second branch would contradict the Suslinity of that
part of the tree, and thus, this property is a strong form of rigidity. But
more, such a tree used as a forcing notion exhibits automatic mutual
genericity. To see this, suppose that g, h ⊆ T are distinct V -generic
filters for this forcing, individually. Let p ∈ T be a node of the tree that
lies on h, but not g. Since the tree was Suslin off the generic branch in
V , it follows that Tp, the part of T consisting of nodes comparable with
p, is a Suslin tree in V [g]. Thus, every antichain of Tp in V [g] is refined
by a level of the tree. Since h is a cofinal branch through Tp, it follows
that h meets every level of the tree and hence also every antichain in
V [g]. So h is V [g]-generic and thus they are mutually generic.
For the second claim, if there is a countable transitive model of ZFC,
then there is one W satisfying ♦, which therefore has a tree that is
Suslin off the generic branch. Thus, any two distinct W -generic filters
g, h ⊆ Q are mutually generic and so W [g] and W [h] are amalgamated
by W [g × h], which is a forcing extension of W . 
The proof of theorem 9 shows that it is relatively consistent with ZFC
that there is a forcing notion exhibiting automatic mutual genericity
and hence supporting amalgamation, but the argument doesn’t settle
the question of whether such kind of forcing exists in every model of
set theory.
Question 10. Is it consistent with ZFC that there is no forcing notion
with automatic mutual genericity?
Note that there are other weaker kinds of necessary amalgamation.
For example, if c is a W -generic Cohen real and A ⊆ ωW1 is W -generic
for the forcing to add a Cohen subset of ω1, then c and A are mutually
generic, because the forcing to add A is countably closed in W and
therefore does not add new antichains for the forcing Add(ω, 1) to add
c. This phenomenon extends to many other pairs of forcing notions P
and Q, such that anyW -generic filters g ⊆ P and h ⊆ Q are necessarily
mutually generic.
3. Upward closure in the generic multiverse
Let us turn now to the question of upward closure. Suppose that we
have a countable increasing chain of forcing extensions
W ⊆W [G0] ⊆W [G1] ⊆W [G2] ⊆ · · · ,
where W is a countable transitive model of set theory.
Question 11. Under which circumstances may we find an upper bound,
a forcing extension W [H ] for which W [Gn] ⊆W [H ] for all n < ω?
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The question is answered by theorem 12, which provides a necessary
and sufficient criterion. It is easy to see several circumstances where
there can be no such upper bound. For example, if the extensions
W [Gn] collapse increasingly large initial segments of W , in such a way
that every cardinal ofW is collapsed in someW [Gn], then obviously we
cannot find an extension ofW to a model of ZFC with the same ordinals
as W . It is also easy to see that in general, we cannot require that
〈Gn | n < ω〉 ∈ W [H ]; this is simply too much to ask. For example, if
every Gn is aW -generic Cohen real, then we could flip the initial bits of
each Gn in such a way that the resulting infinite sequence 〈Gn | n < ω〉
was coding an arbitrary real z, even though such a change would not
affect the models W [Gn], since each Gn individually was changed only
finitely. This issue is discussed at length in [FHR15].
Following ideas in [HLL15], let us define that the forcing degree of a
forcing extension W ⊆ W [H ], where H ⊆ P ∈ W is W -generic, is the
smallest size inW of the Boolean completion of a forcing notion Q ∈ W
for which there is a W -generic filter G ⊆ Q for which W [G] = W [H ].
Thus, the forcing degree of a forcing extension is the smallest size
of a complete Boolean algebra realizing that extension as a forcing
extension.
Theorem 12. Suppose that W is a countable transitive model of ZFC
and that
W ⊆W [G0] ⊆W [G1] ⊆ W [G2] ⊆ · · · ⊆ W [Gn] ⊆ · · ·
is an increasing chain of forcing extensions W [Gn], where Gn ⊆ Qn is
W -generic. Then the following are equivalent:
(1) The chain is bounded above by a forcing extension W [H ], for
some forcing notion Q ∈ W and W -generic filter H ⊆ Q.
(2) The forcing degrees of the extensions W ⊆ W [Gn] are bounded
in W
Proof. (2 → 1). This direction is essentially [FHR15, thm. 39], but
I shall sketch the argument. Let us first handle the case of product
forcing, rather than iterated forcing, the case for which we have a tower
with the form
W ⊆W [g0] ⊆W [g0][g1] ⊆W [g0][g1][g2] ⊆ · · · ,
where the gn ⊆ Pn ∈ W are finitely mutually generic over W , and the
Pn are uniformly bounded in size by a cardinal γ in W . Let θ > γ be
a sufficiently large regular cardinal in W so that we may enumerate
〈Rα | α < θ〉 in W all the possible forcing notions in W of size at most
γ, up to isomorphism, with unbounded repetition. Let R =
∏
αRα be
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the finite support product. This forcing has the γ+-chain condition.
Let H ⊆ R be any
⋃
nW [g0 × · · · × gn]-generic filter. Select a cofinal
sequence 〈θn | n < ω〉 converging to θ, for which Rθn = Pn, and modify
the filter H to use gn at coordinate θn instead of what H had there. If
H∗ is the new filter, then H(θn) = gn, but at all other coordinates it
agrees with H . Since R is γ+-c.c., it follows that any maximal antichain
for R in W has bounded support, and thus interacts with only finitely
many of the coordinates θn upon which we performed surgery. But H is
mutually generic with those finitely many gn, and so that finite amount
of surgery will preserve genericity. So W [H∗] is a forcing extension of
W , and every gn ∈ W [H
∗] by construction. So W [g0 × · · · × gn] ⊆
W [H∗], as desired. For the general case, where we have iterated forcing
rather than product forcing, consider a tower W ⊆W [G0] ⊆W [G1] ⊆
· · · , where each Gn ⊆ Qn ∈ W is W -generic and the Qn are bounded
in size. By collapsing the bound, and furthermore using a filter g for
the collapse that is not only W -generic, but also W [Gn]-generic for
every n—this is possible because there are still only countably many
dense sets altogether in
⋃
nW [Gn]—we produce a larger tower W ⊆
W [g] ⊆ W [g][G0] ⊆ W [g][G1] ⊆ · · · , where now the forcing Qn is
countable in W [g] and thus isomorphic to the forcing to add a Cohen
real there. By quotient forcing, we may therefore view this larger tower
as W ⊆ W [g] ⊆W [g][c0] ⊆W [g][c0][c1] ⊆W [g][c0][c1][c2] ⊆ · · · , where
W [g][Gn] = W [g][c0 × · · · × cn]. Thus, we have reduced to the case of
product forcing, for which we have already explained how to find an
upper bound W [H ] containing every W [g][co×· · ·× cn] and hence also
every W [Gn] in the original tower.
(1 → 2). This direction is similar to [HLL15, lemma 23], which was
used in the context of the modal logic of forcing to show that the value
of the forcing degree of a model over a fixed ground model is a ratchet,
which is to say, that it can be made larger, but never smaller, with
further forcing. Suppose that we have a tower W ⊆W [G0] ⊆W [G1] ⊆
· · · , which is bounded above by the forcing extension W [H ], where
H ⊆ Q ∈ W is W -generic. Since W ⊆ W [Gn] ⊆ W [H ], it follows by
the intermediate model result of [Jec03, lemma 15.43] that there is a
complete subalgebra C ⊆ B, where B is the Boolean completion of Q
in W , such that W [Gn] = W [G
′] for some W -generic filter G′ ⊆ C.
Thus, the forcing degree of the extension W ⊆ W [Gn] is bounded by
the size of |B|W , and this does not depend on n. So the extensions have
uniformly bounded forcing degrees over W . 
In the result of theorem 12, the upper bound of W [H ] provided by
the proof involves possibly collapsing a lot of cardinals, but we might
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not want to do that. For example, in question 6 we have a tower of
extensions
W ⊆W [c0] ⊆W [c1] ⊆W [c2] ⊆ · · · ,
where each cn is aW -generic Cohen real, and we’d like to know whether
we can find an upper bound also of this form. A close inspection of
the proof of (2 → 1) in theorem 12 shows that we can dispense with
the collapse forcing in this case, but the rest of the argument involves
an uncountable product R of Cohen-real forcing; we can actually use
Add(ω, ω1) in that argument for this case. So the proof does not di-
rectly produce an upper bound in the form W [d] of adding a single
Cohen real.
Nevertheless, it is true that we can find an upper bound of this
form, and this is what I shall now prove in theorem 13. Specifi-
cally, I claim that the collection of models M [c] obtained by adding
an M-generic Cohen real c over a fixed countable transitive model
of set theory M is upwardly countably closed, in the sense that ev-
ery increasing countable chain has an upper bound. I proved this
theorem with Giorgio Venturi back in 2011 in a series of conversa-
tions at the Young Set Theory Workshop in Bonn and continuing at
the London summer school on set theory.
Theorem 13. For any countable transitive model W |= ZFC, the col-
lection of all forcing extensions W [c] by adding a W -generic Cohen real
is upward-countably closed. That is, for any countable tower of such
forcing extensions
W ⊆ W [c0] ⊆ W [c1] ⊆ · · · ⊆W [cn] ⊆ · · · ,
we may find a W -generic Cohen real d such that W [cn] ⊆ W [d] for
every natural number n.
Proof. Suppose that we have such a tower of forcing extensionsW [c0] ⊆
W [c1] ⊆ W [c2], and so on. Note that if W [b] ⊆ W [c] for W -generic
Cohen reals b and c, then W [c] is a forcing extension of W [b] by a
quotient of the Cohen-real forcing. But since the Cohen forcing itself
has a countable dense set, it follows that all such quotients also have
a countable dense set, and so W [c] = W [b][b1] for some W [b]-generic
Cohen real b1. Thus, we may view the tower as having the form:
W [b0] ⊆ W [b0 × b1] ⊆ · · · ⊆W [b0 × b1 × · · · × bn] ⊆ · · · ,
where now it follows that any finite collection of the reals bi are mutu-
ally W -generic.
Of course, we cannot expect in general that the real 〈bn | n < ω〉 is
W -generic for Add(ω, ω), since this real may be very badly behaved.
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For example, the sequence of first-bits of the bn’s may code a very
naughty real z, which cannot be added by forcing over W at all. So in
general, we cannot allow that this sequence is added to the limit model
W [d]. (See further discussion in my blog post [Ham15b].) We shall
instead undertake a construction by making finitely many changes to
each real bn, resulting in a real dn, in such a way that the resulting
combined real d = ⊕ndn is W -generic for the forcing to add ω-many
Cohen reals, which is of course isomorphic to adding just one. To do
this, let’s get a little more clear with our notation. We regard each bn
as an element of Cantor space 2ω, that is, an infinite binary sequence,
and the corresponding filter associated with this real is the collection
of finite initial segments of bn, which will be a W -generic filter through
the partial order of finite binary sequences 2<ω, which is one of the
standard isomorphic copies of Cohen forcing. We will think of d as a
binary function on the plane d : ω×ω → 2, where the nth slice dn is the
corresponding function ω → 2 obtained by fixing the first coordinate
to be n.
Now, we enumerate the countably many open dense subsets of W
for the forcing to add a Cohen real ω × ω → 2 as D0, D1, and so on.
Now, we construct d in stages. Before stage n, we will have completely
specified dk for k < n, and we also may be committed to a finite con-
dition pn−1 in the forcing to add ω many Cohen reals. We consider the
dense set Dn. We may factor Add(ω, ω) as Add(ω, n)×Add(ω, [n, ω)).
Since d0× · · ·× dn−1 is actually W -generic (since these are finite mod-
ifications of the corresponding bk’s, which are mutually W -generic, it
follows that there is some finite extension of our condition pn−1 to a
condition pn ∈ Dn, which is compatible with d0 × · · · × dn−1. Let
dn be the same as bn, except finitely modified to be compatible with
pn. In this way, our final real ⊕ndn will contain all the conditions
pn, and therefore be W -generic for Add(ω, ω), yet every bn will differ
only finitely from dn and hence be an element of W [d]. So we have
W [b0] · · · [bn] ⊆W [d], and we have found our upper bound. 
Notice that the real d we construct is not only W -generic, but also
W [cn]-generic for every n.
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